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FIRST AMENDMENT DECISIONS - 2002 TERM

Joel Gora'

INTRODUCTION
I always find it a wonderful opportunity to talk about the
Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions in order to try to
indicate some trends and patterns. The First Amendment was not
"first" in the heart of the Supreme Court last term; it was zero and
five.2 This was the first term in many that the Court dealt with a
variety of First Amendment issues, and in none of these cases did
the First Amendment claim or claimant prevail.' In every case, the

Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Pomona
College; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law.
2 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (holding that a ban on cross
burning done with an intent to intimidate does not violate the First Amendment);
Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 123 S. Ct. 1829 (2003)
(holding States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or
misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their
donations will be used); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 123 S. Ct.
2297 (2003) (holding the Children's Internet Protection Act does not impose an
unconstitutional condition on libraries that receive E-rate and LSTA subsidies
by requiring them, as a condition on that receipt, to surrender their First
Amendment right to provide the public access to constitutionally protected
speech); Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003) (holding the Richmond
Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy was not facially invalid
under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine); FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S.
Ct. 2200 (2003) (holding that applying the direct contribution prohibition to
nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment). One
other case last term implicated First Amendment concerns. See Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding copyright extension law as not
First Amendment interests).
violating
3
1d.
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Court either rejected or qualified the First Amendment argument.4
In my opinion, the Court gave a certain amount of deference to the
executive and legislative branches. In each of the five cases I am
going to talk about, the Court reached out, heard an appeal from
the government, and reversed a decision of a lower court that had
ruled in favor of the First Amendment. This is the pattern: there
seems to be a certain amount of deference for the government,
government

concerns, and

government arguments

that are

advanced to try to limit free speech and First Amendment rights.
In closing, I will attempt to indicate whether the same deference
towards the government will be given and whether less protection
afforded for First Amendment rights will be a problem in the
coming term.

HATE SPEECH
The first case I will discuss deals with the age-old problem
of hate speech. The case is Virginia v. Black.' The Supreme Court
4

Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549-50 (finding that a state, consistent with the First

Amendment, may ban cross burning done with an intent to intimidate);
Telemarketing Assocs., 123 S. Ct. at 1836 (finding that the First Amendment
protects the right to engage in charitable solicitation, but fraudulent charitable
solicitation is unprotected speech); Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2306
(finding that use of internet filtering software does not violate patrons' First
Amendment rights because filtering software may be disabled upon request);
Hicks, 123 S. Ct. at 2199 (finding that the overbreadth doctrine could not be
applied to a public housing authority's trespass policy because the record did not
show that the policy as a whole prohibited a substantial amount of protected
speech in relation to its many legitimate applications); Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. at
2210-11 (finding that restrictions on political contributions have been treated as
merely "marginal" speech restrictions).
5 123 S. Ct. at 1536.
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had before it a Virginia statute that made it a crime to bum a cross
with the intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.6 The
statute further provided that, "any cross burning was prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate." 7 The Court had to decide
whether states could outlaw such cross burning.'

In the past, the

Court has decided a number of cases addressing whether a
government can restrict hateful speech, speech that denigrates
people on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sexual
orientation, or gender.'

This was the first case in a long time

where the Court had to deal with the question of whether the
government can prohibit cross burning when done with intent to
intimidate. The Court answered this question in the positive, so
long as there is very clear proof that the intent of the cross burner
is intimidation."0

The Court sent the case back for further review,

but with the basic message that there is nothing wrong with the
government seeking to prohibit the expressive use of this type of
symbol where it can be proven that it was done with intent to
6 Id.at

1541-42. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (2003) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent
of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or
cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a
highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate
any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6
felony. Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of

persons.

7 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542.
8

Id.at 1541.
9 See, e.g., R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (finding an
ordinance prohibiting otherwise permitted speech solely on basis of its content is
facially unconstitutional).
'Black 123 S. Ct. at 1550.

TOURO LA WREVIEW

254

[Vol 20

intimidate."
In reaching its decision, the Court pointed out that the
history of cross burning goes back to the 14th Century and noted
that cross burning can be a symbol of ideas, association, or a
rallying point for the people that subscribe to it.'2 On the other
hand, it can also be a threat of violence, a message that a person
against whom the threat is directed should fear for their very life if
necessary. 3

In this country, cross burning has been associated

with the rather odious history of racism and racial violence;
however, it is not based only on race, but on religion as well. 4 As
a result, the Court was sensitive to the fact that cross burning can
come in two guises: as communication of a message or as a threat
or intimidation. 5
The problem with the statute in this case was that it singled
out a particular threat. 6

It was not the general threat or

intimidation; it was threatening someone by burning a cross.' 7 In
effect, the state was discriminating in favor of one point of view
that racism is bad, while not being concerned with other points of
view." The Court had to deal with the cross burning issue in this
manner because in a case decided about ten years prior, R. A. V v.

"Id. at 1552.
12Id. at 1544-45.

Id. at 1546-47.
Ia

14Id. at 1545-46.

"5Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1546.
16 Id. at 1548.
'7 Id. at 1549.
' Id. at 1549-50.
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City of St.Paul,9 it held that if states want to ban hate speech, they
cannot pick and choose which hate speech they will ban; states had
to be "equal opportunity prohibitors" of hate speech.2"
This case seemed to pose a problem for the cross burning
statute at issue in Black. In R. A. V., the Court held that the statute
would pose a problem if it made it a crime to intimidate someone
by burning a cross because of the race or religion of the target of
the intimidation.2 However, in the Black case, the statute punished
anyone who burned a cross in an intimidating way for any point of
view against anybody.22 So, if your target was Black, Jewish, or
Catholic, a union member, a Democrat, or a gay person, the statute
would apply.23 The Court stated it was not favoring one point of
view: anybody who bums a cross for any reason in an effort to
intimidate a person that one does not like on any grounds can be
subject to punishment under the Virginia statute, and the Court
held to do so was acceptable under the First Amendment. 4 Since
threats are not protected under the First Amendment, the Court
said the use of cross burning to intimidate is akin to a threat and, as

'9 505 U.S. at 377.
Id. at 391.
21
Id. at 393.

20

22 Black,

123 S. Ct. at 1549.

23

Id.

24

Id. The Court explained:
[T]he Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only
that speech directed toward one of the specified disfavored

topics. It does not matter whether an individual bums a cross
with intent to intimidate because of the victim's race, gender,
or religion, or because of the victim's 'political affiliation,
union membership, or homosexuality.'

256
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a result, the singling out of cross burning was not violative of the
First Amendment."

Six Justices supported the decision; there was

no majority opinion.2 6 The aforesaid position was taken by four of
the Justices,27 while two other Justices, Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas dissented.28
An interesting point to note is that Justice Thomas actually
felt that the statute was valid. 29 He was the one Justice who would
have upheld the statute because he said that the history of cross
burning in America is so vile and 'so linked to violence and
terrorism that it could not be viewed as simply another way of
expressing a point of view.3" Another interesting point to note is
25

Id. ("Virginia may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in

light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending
violence.").
26 Id. at 1541. Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion
in which Justices
Breyer, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Justices Scalia and Thomas filed
separate opinions.
-7 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549-50.
Justices Breyer, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and
Stevens reasoned that cross burning is a threatening expression, therefore
proscribable, but invalidated the portion of the law that allowed the act of cross
burning to be considered prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Id.
28 Id. at 1552, 1562. Justice Scalia dissented in part because of
the rebuttable
presumption in the prima facie provision of the Virginia statute. He also noted
that the Virginia Supreme Court had not handed down a binding construction of
the provision, and it was therefore improper for the Supreme Court to pass upon
its constitutionality. However, Justice Scalia did concur in the judgment and in
the plurality's analysis of the First Amendment. Id at 1557 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas disagreed with the Court's decision to treat the
statute as a First Amendment violation, reasoning that the Virginia statute
prohibited conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutionally valid without
regard to First Amendment jurisprudence. Id at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In light of my conclusion
that the
statute here addresses only conduct, there is no need to analyze it under any of
our First Amendment tests.").
30 Id. at 1564 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In our culture, cross burning has
almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims
well-grounded fear of physical violence.").
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that Justice Thomas, who is not known for active participation
during oral arguments to the Court,3 felt so strongly about this
issue that he peppered the defendants' lawyer with a number of
questions which then became the basis for his opinion.

Justice

Thomas indicated that he would clearly uphold the statute at issue
despite the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
There were three dissenters, the "liberals" of free speech,
Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.

The dissenters stated

they were against racism just as much as the next person, but that
the government singled out a particular symbol of racism or racial
antagonism or violence. 3

They feared the statute was not just

protecting against threats or intimidation, but it was also
suppressing ideas that are communicated in a symbolic fashion.'
To put it another way, the dissenters felt that the statute was not
primarily about preserving or protecting peace; rather, its primary
purpose was to prevent disfavored communication and hateful
31 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, After a Quiet Spell, Justice Thomas Finds Voice,

THE WASHINGTON POST, May 24, 1999, at Al (stating that, "[Thomas] was
quiet in his early years, rarely speaking during oral arguments.").
32 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562-69 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Although the Virginia statute in issue
here contains no such express basis of limitation on prohibited subject matter,
the specific prohibition of cross burning with intent to discriminate selects a
symbol with particular content from the field of all proscribable expressions
meant to intimidate.").
34 Id. at 1561-62 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissenters noted:
[T]he provision will encourage a fact-finder to err on the side
of finding intent to intimidate when the evidence of
circumstances fails to point with any clarity to either the
criminal intent or to the permissible one .... To the extent the
prima facie evidence provision skews prosecutions, then, it
skews the statute toward suppressing ideas.
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points of view." As such, the dissenters did not find a compelling
interest to justify the singling out of this particular symbol or
method of communication.
Ultimately, the case was remanded because the statute not
only made it a crime to burn the cross with intent to intimidate, but
also allowed the act of burning the cross to serve as prima facie
evidence of the required intent needed to satisfy the statute." The
Court decided that this presumption, that there was intent to
intimidate, must be found beyond a reasonable doubt in each
case." Therefore, it was really a defect of procedure, not a defect
of entitlement, that caused the Court to reverse the convictions of
the individuals who had been convicted under this cross burning
statute.38 This case demonstrates loss number one for the First
Amendment, or victory number one if you are on the opposite side
of the fence. The consequence of the Black decision is to limit the
effect of the R. A. V case and to allow the government to regulate
the use of symbols associated with violence.

35 Id. at 1562 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[The prima facie evidence] has a very
obvious significance as a mechanism for bringing within the statute's
prohibition some expression that is doubtfully threatening though certainly
distasteful.").
6Id. at 1552.
37 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551 ("The prima facie evidence provision... ignores
all of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular
cross burning is intended to intimidate. The First Amendment does not permit

such a shortcut.").
31Id

at 1551-52.
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CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
A more positive theme I want to discuss is found in Illinois
v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,39 which involved charitable
solicitation.4 ° For a number of years, the Court has wrestled with
the question of state efforts to regulate charitable solicitation.4
Those efforts usually took the form of limits or prohibitions on the
amount of charitable solicitation that can go towards fundraising
expenses."

Many states wanted to say if you are a charity, you

cannot spend on expenses on fundraising costs more than 50% of
what you raise.43 You have to spend at least 50% on the objects of
your charity for educational purposes or the like.44 In a number of
cases going back to the early 1980s, the Schaumburg case,4 the

'9 123 S. Ct. at 1829.
40 Id. at 1832 ("This case concerns the amenability of for-profit fundraising
corporations to suit by the Attorney General of Illinois for fraudulent charitable
solicitations.").
41 See, e.g, Viii. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620
(1980) (finding that the Village Code violated the First Amendment as it only
granted solicitation permits to charitable organizations that used 75% of their
receipts for charitable purposes).
42 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking
down
three-tiered regulatory scheme aimed at outlawing "unreasonable" fees retained
by professional fundraisers).
43 Id. at 784. The Court explained:
Responding to a study showing that in the previous five years
the State's largest professional fundraisers had retained as fees
and costs well over 50 percent of the gross revenues collected
in charitable solicitation drives, North Carolina amended its
Charitable Solicitations Act . . . (to prohibit] professional
fundraisers from retaining an unreasonable or excessive fee.
Id.
44id
45

444 U.S. at 620.
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Munson case, 46 and the Riley case,47 the Court had struck down, in
each instance, flat statutory percentages or limits on the amount of
funds or percentage of funds that charitable organizations could
spend on raising funds.48 The concern was that society wants the
charity to be in the business of supporting charity, not supporting
their own employees. It seemed like it would be difficult for the
government to regulate the amount of funds that were spent for
charities' solicitation.
The litigation in Telemarketing Associates was a result of a
longstanding dispute between the State of Illinois and a
telemarketing

group.

The Illinois Attorney General

sued

professional fundraisers hired by a charitable organization for
fraud, alleging that they fraudulently misrepresented the portion of
charitable donations which they retained as fundraising costs. 9 In
this case, there was a group that was raising money for a Vietnam
veterans organization called VietNow. The government filed suit
against the group after it discovered that 85% of the money raised
went to fundraising costs, while only 15% went to supporting
veterans' activities, charities, and benefits.5" The Court held that
"[s]tates may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false
or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about
Sec'y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
487 U.S. at 781.
48 Telemarketing Assoc., 123 S. Ct. at 1835 ("Each of the three decisions
46

47

invalidated state or -local laws that categorically restrained solicitation by

charities or professional fundraisers if a high percentage of the funds raised
would
be used to cover administrative or fundraising costs.").
49
Id. at 1834.

5

ld. at 1833.
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how their donations will be used."'" Other decisions have stated
the opposite, namely that the government cannot interfere when a
group spends all of the money it raises on itself

2

The decisions

that went this way noted that chdritable solicitation is First
Amendment work. 3

In these decisions, the Court stated that

whether the object of your charity is a hospital, law school,
university, or veterans group, it is speech protected by the First
Amendment and freedom of association.54 This is why government
interference was found unconstitutional."

Had it only been that

the veterans group was spending a lot of what it raised, Illinois
would not have had much of a case.
In Telemarketing Associates, the problem was that the
veterans group was not being honest about the percentage of
money it was keeping for itself and the percentage that was going
to veterans' activities.

The group did not lie, but it engaged in

statements that were misrepresentations of that percentage.56 So,
the question before the Court was whether, despite the First
Amendment, the government could commence an action against
"' Id. at 1843.
52

See, e.g., Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 620 (finding that a village code violated

the First Amendment because it only granted solicitation permits to charitable
organizations that used 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes); Munson,
467 U.S. at 947 (finding that state statute imposing percentage limitation on
corporation charitable solicitation was unconstitutional); Riley, 487 U.S. at 781

(finding that state statute prohibiting professional fundraisers from retaining
unreasonable or excessive fees unconstitutionally infringed on First Amendment
rights).
*3

Id.

54 id.
55 id.
56

TelemarketingAssocs., 123 S. Ct. at 1833.
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them, not for spending too much on their fundraising activities, but
for being disingenuous about it, for misrepresenting it."

The

Supreme Court unanimously decided that the answer was "yes."
The First Amendment is "not a bar to honestly brought fraud suits
against the charity where the charity misrepresents or is alleged to
have misrepresented the amount of money that goes to fundraising
versus the amount of money that goes to the charitable purpose
itself.5"
This decision makes sense. A fraud can be prosecuted,
even fraud in the area of the First Amendment, although it has to
be done much more carefully in such cases.

Thus, we want a

vigorous, uninhibited and robust debate on public issues.

We do

not want people to speak only if they can prove what they are
saying is true beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the other hand,

where solicitation of funds is involved, the Court has always
allowed an extra margin for government regulation because money
is changing hands.59 Even though the three cases I referred to
prohibit the government from setting percentages or limits on the
amount of money that charities can use for their own fundraising
activities, the First Amendment does not prohibit the ability of the
government to prosecute for fraud.'

As such, the Court reversed

5 Id. at 1832-33.

58 Id. at 1843.
59 See, e.g., Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 620; Munson, 467 U.S. at 947; Riley, 487
U.S. at 781.
60 Telemarketing Assocs., 123 S. Ct. at 1833 ("While bare failure to disclose

[the percentage of charitable donations fundraisers retain for themselves]
directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when
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the matter and sent it back to the Illinois court for further
proceedings, rejecting the effort to dismiss the case on First
Amendment grounds.6 '
What is interesting about the case is that if one had read
some of the press accounts of the argument, it seemed like it was
closely divided between those who felt this was an impermissible
effort to restrict the charitable solicitation and those who thought
the prosecution for fraud was a valid concern; yet, when the case
emerged, it was a nine-to-nothing decision.6 2 It may have been that
there was some good advocacy on the government's side, or
maybe Justice Ginsburg's opinion, which gathered unanimous
support, clarified issues in a way that had not been so clear prior to
oral argument. In any event, it is clear that despite the rules the
Court has handed down protecting charitable solicitation under the
First Amendment, those rules do not protect charities against
charges of fraudulent solicitation, and state and local governments
are entitled to prosecute where they can validate alleged fraud. 3
This was a rare case where the Court allowed prosecution despite
First Amendment concerns.

nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed
to deceive the listener, the First Amendment leaves room for a fraud claim.").
61 Id.at 1843.
62 Justice Ginsburg delivered the unanimous opinion and Justices Scalia and

Thomas filed concurring opinions.
63 TelemarketingAssocs., 123 S. Ct. at 1833.
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Nike, Inc. v. KaskyM
I want to spend a moment on a case the Court did not
decide, but it relates to this theme of both solicitation and
misrepresentation. That is the case of Nike, Inc. v. Kasky. There is
not a lengthy First Amendment opinion in this case because the
Court dismissed it after deciding that it should not have agreed to
hear the case. 6' The Nike case raises fascinating First Amendment
issues that are going to come back up to the Court.
The worldwide company, Nike, Inc., whose well-known
logo is the "Swoosh," has been attacked for years by activists
claiming their workers are laboring under substandard conditions
in foreign countries.66 As a result of these criticisms, Nike put out
a series of editorial responses in which it stated that its workers
were well treated, not mistreated, and the claims against them were
false.67

One of Nike's critics found a California statute that

allowed suit against a business for misrepresentation.6"

64

123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (per curiam).

65

Id.

Even

The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted in

its per curiam decision. The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens and Justice
Ginsburg explains three reasons why the Court could not hear the case, with
Justice Souter concurring as to third. First, the Court did not have appellate
jurisdiction to hear the case because the California Supreme Court never entered
a final judgment. Second, neither party had standing to invoke the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Finally, the case presented novel First Amendment
questions that could not be decided by the Court at this stage. Id. at 2555.
66 Id. at 2554.
67 Id. at 2555.
68 Id. at 2554-55. The California resident sued Nike under §§ 17200 and
17500 of California's Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2003) states: "unfair competition shall mean

and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
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though the government of California chose not to sue, the Nike
critic did. The Nike critic sued on a kind of private attorney
general theory, seeking damages if he could prove that Nike
misrepresented its position that it did not employ laborers under
substandard conditions. 69

Nike argued that the critic raised an

issue against it regarding speech which constituted political
speech. As such, Nike argued that the critic could not subject it to
a truth test for political speech, only commercial speech, which
was not the case here.70
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising ... ." CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17500 (2003) states in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association,
or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to
dispose of real or personal property or to perform services,
professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature
whatsoever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation
relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or
disseminated before the public in this state, or to make or
disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated from this
state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other
publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or
proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever,
including over the Internet, any statement, concerning that real
or personal property or those services, professional or
otherwise, or concerning any circumstance or matter of fact
connected with the proposed performance or disposition
thereof, which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or
which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to
be untrue or misleading, or for any person, firm, or
corporation to so make or disseminate or cause to be so made
or disseminated any such statement as part of a plan or scheme
with the intent not to sell that personal property or those
services, professional or otherwise, so advertised at the price
stated therein, or as so advertised.
69 Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2555. In fact, the critic did not sue for personal damages
sustained by him individually, but, upon information and belief of Nike's false
statements regarding their working conditions, on behalf of the general public of
the State of California. Id.
70 id

266
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The

California

commercial speech.7 '

Supreme

Court

found

that

it was

Even though the subject was labor

conditions, it was expressed in the context of trying to sell new
products.72 As such, since the court found Nike's speech to be
commercial, less First Amendment protection was available, and
Nike could be subjected to punishment for the allegedly deceitful
speech.73 Nike took the case up to the Supreme Court and it looked
like it was going to be an extremely important decision about two
issues: (1) whether commercial speech should still be treated less
favorably under the First Amendment than political speech; and (2)
whether monetary damages or penalty suits could be implemented
against the company for putting out information to protect its
product against its critics.
We will have to wait for the answers to those questions,
and they are questions that relate to globalization and the political
disputes that globalization has generated.

The United States

Supreme Court essentially found that it could not properly decide
the case on various grounds. One ground for the Court deciding
not to hear the case was that since California had not even had a
trial yet, it had merely sustained the complaint against the First

Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (2002) (finding the messages in
question were commercial speech because they were directed by a
commercial speaker to a commercial audience for the purpose of promoting
sales of products).
72 Id.
73
Id at 259.
71

FIRST AMENDMENT DECISIONS
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Amendment defense and there was no finality to the appeal.74 We
do not know if that was the Court's theory because there was no
opinion from the Court stating this. There were a few Justices who
wrote on that. 5 The second thought was that Mr. Kasky, the Nike
critic, did not have standing to sue.76 He was not a government
agency enforcing the law, he was an interloper with no warrant to
proceed.

PORNOGRAPHY
The third case I want to discuss is United States v.
American Library Association."

What would any term of the

Supreme Court be without a little pornography case? This case
involves part of the federal government's never ending war against
pornography on the Internet.'

This is the third case that the Court

has had in about six years dealing with federal efforts to regulate
pornography or sexually-oriented materials on the Internet either
for grown-ups or, more recently and more pointedly, to regulate
them for children, to keep young people from having access to
those materials.79 The first case dealing with this issue, Reno v.
ACLU,"0 involved the Communications Decency Act,8 wherein the

Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2555.
Id. at 2555-57.
6
"' Id. at 2557.
77 123 S. Ct. at 2297.
78 Id.
79
Id. at 2301.
o 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
81 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1XB) (2003) provides:
74
71

268
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Court basically noted that the Internet is an important new medium
of free speech and open communication. 2 The Court struck down
very broad restrictions on communicating indecent or sexual
material on the Internet. 3
In more recent cases, the Court has taken a more balanced
view and has given more deference to government concerns.84
That is true in the American LibraryAssociation case. This case
involved the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA").85 CIPA
provides that any library receiving federal assistance must have
filters on its computers to filter out sexual material.86 CIPA further
provides that library patrons are to be blocked from typing in
websites like "Playboy.com."

T

If library patrons want to access

Whoever . . . by means of a telecommunications device
knowingly... makes, creates, or solicits and.., initiates the
transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication;
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
82 Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 ("The Internet is 'a unique and wholly new
medium
of worldwide human communication."') (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
843Id. at 882.
See, e.g., Am. LibraryAss'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2297.
85 Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 9134(0, 254(h)(6)
(2003).
CIPA forbade public libraries to receive federal assistance for internet access
unless there was software to block or filter obscene or pornographic computer
images
in order to protect minors from such images. Id.
86
Am. LibraryAss'n, 123 S.Ct. at 2301-02.
87 Id.at 2302 (citing Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 401,
428 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
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Playboy's website and others like it, they are required to ask the
librarian, and he or she will provide a code for access to the site. 8
The

question

before

the

Court

was

whether

the

government, through its spending powers, could require libraries to
be censors of Playboy's website or other similar websites8 9 The
majority of the Court held that censoring such websites was not
violative of the First Amendment, based on two theories.'
The minority had argued that a library is like a public
forum.9' The library is a place to communicate ideas and points of
view; therefore, censorship of such ideas and points of view by the
library is impermissible.92 The Court did not find this argument
persuasive.93 Libraries are in the business of picking and choosing
books and ideas. During this process, they do not create a public
forum for every person in the library with a card to use it to receive
or communicate any and all ideas they want.'

The Court found

that a library is a government-funded activity which provides a
place for research, scholarship, and learning. It is not a place for
every speaker who wants to speak on the Internet and every
Internet speaker that wants to speak to someone on a public library

88

Id. at 2306.

89

Id. at 2307-08.

90 Id. at 2309.
9' Am. Library Ass"n, 123 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (citing Am. Library Ass'n , 201 F.
Supp. 2d at 466).
9 Id. at 2303.
93
Id. at 2304-05.
94
Id. at 2303-04.
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terminal."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited a couple of
cases which, if correctly decided, would support its position. One
case held that when public television stations sponsor a political
debate among candidates, they do not have to let every candidate
participate because the station is just presenting a program. 6 The
same holds true when the federal government funds art through the
National Endowment for the Arts."

The government does not

have to fund "scuzzy" art; it can fund only wholesome art.9" It is
not a public forum; it is the government paying the piper and
calling the tune. So, on that theory, the Court held it is permissible
to make libraries that receive federal funds put filters on their
computers."
The other argument against this restriction was that it was
an unconstitutional condition which, in effect, tells libraries, "your
money or your life."'"

If the library wants the federal benefit, it

has to give up its First Amendment freedom and allow government
censorship. The Court disagreed with this assertion. It found that
the library is, in effect, a government program. As such, it is akin
to when the government gives money to teach one type of subject,
prohibiting you from spending money on teaching other subjects.''

9'Id.at 2305.
96 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998).
97 See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998).
9'Id.at 585.
99

Am. LibraryAss 'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2304-05.
1°°Id at 2316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10'Id. at 2308.
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Therefore, the Court determined that the statute was constitutional
and not in violation of the First Amendment.'0 2
An interesting aspect to this decision is that Justices who
are sometimes, but not invariably, First Amendment partisans, that
being Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, were
joined by Kennedy and Breyer, two liberal Justices, in agreeing
that the statute did not violate the First Amendment." 3 Justice
Kennedy thought it was no big deal to ask the library to unlock
Playboy.com because to do so was not an interference with free
speech rights."°

Justice Breyer thought that the government's

interest in protecting children outweighed the impact on the adult
who wants to access Playboy.com in the public library.'
There were some dissenters who found that this was pure,
old-fashioned censorship.'"

They found that the government is

censoring materials which are not illegal or hardcore obscenity,
and by censoring these materials, the government was using its
"power of the purse" to engage in impermissible censorship of
valid ideas."0 7 As it turns out, the power of the purse prevailed, and
in a six-to-three decision, the Court upheld CIPA's requirement
that public libraries use these filtering systems.'o8

102
03

1

Id. at 2308-09.
Am. LibraryAss'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2300.

'O Id. at

2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

°S Id at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
'6 Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107 id
08

1

Am. LibraryAss 'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2309.
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PUBLIC HOUSING
The next First Amendment case I would like to discuss is
Virginia v. Hicks."°

The decision was unanimous, and Justice

Scalia wrote the opinion."' In this case, there was a public housing
project concerned about the number of people who were coming
around committing crimes on the premises, parkways, and
streets."' As a result, the public housing manager tried to privatize
the streets by implementing a rule that anytime an individual came
on the premises without permission or without a proper purpose,
he or she would automatically be deemed a trespasser." 2 The rule
was if you came on once without having the proper purpose, you
were told not to come on again."' If you came on the second time,
you would be arrested for trespassing.

There was some

indication that the public housing manager had unfettered
discretion to decide whether or not individuals were allowed to
come onto the premises to hand out leaflets." 5 There was also
some indication that there was a screening of ideas that was being
undertaken by a government official." 6

'99 123

S. Ct. at 2191.
" Id at 2194.
Id.
2

1d. at 2195.
Id.

Hicks, 123 S. Ct. at 2195.
' 6 id. at 2197-98.
" 1d. at 2196, 2198.
114
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In this particular case, an individual named Hicks came

onto the premises to see his family, not to hand out leaflets or
conduct door-to-door lobbying for candidates." 7 Due to a family
dispute, Hicks was once told to leave the premises. When he came
back a second time, he was arrested for trespass." 8 The lower
courts in Virginia upheld the First Amendment defense and found
that although Hicks did not have a First Amendment purpose in
visiting the housing project, other people might." 9

The courts

viewed the rule requiring people to obtain permission from the
manager as a prior restraint and pure censorship.12' Therefore, the
restrictive nature of the rule was found to be a violation of the
21
rights afforded by the First Amendment.'
The United States Supreme Court reversed. It found that if
there is anything wrong with the statute, it is that it is too broad;
but in this case, Hicks was an individual with a family dispute.' 2
As such, the Court found that the statute was operating in a way
that was not in violation of the First Amendment, and just because
it might have some possible First Amendment problems in another
context dealing with another person, the statute is not substantially
overbroad or defective." 2

The Court declined to wipe out the

"17 Id at 2198; see also Hicks v. Virginia, 548 S.E.2d 249, 252
(Va. Ct. App.
2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
123 S. Ct. at 2195.
"SHicks,
"19 See Virginia v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 680 (Va. 2002); see also Hicks, 548
S.E.2d at 251.
120 Hicks, 563 S.E.2d at 679-80, 68 1.

121

Id. at 680.
See Hicks, 123 S. Ct. at 2199.

122
123 id.
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whole statute on a theory of overbreadth. 2 ' It reminded us that
striking down a law on behalf of somebody who themselves can be
regulated or restricted is a potent medicine because then the whole
law goes down.'25 The Court noted that if most of the uses of the
law are proper, the Court should respect
hypothetical

uses

of the trespass

law

it.'26

and the

Potential
potential

impermissible uses under the First Amendment are too marginal to
strike down the whole law. 127 All nine Justices went along with
that reasoning and reaffirmed both that the overbreadth doctrine
will not be used freely and that housing projects can seek to restrict
access to their premises by people who do not wish to engage in
28
First Amendment activity.-'

CAMPAIGN FINANCE
The final case where the Court rejected First Amendment
claims turned out to be a harbinger of things to come. In Federal
Election Commission v. Beaumont,'29 the Court had to decide
whether a nonprofit, ideological advocacy organization, which
happened to be a corporation, could be barred from making

124

id.

Id. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
at 2198.
127 123 S. Ct. at 2197.
1281 d. at 2199.
129 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003).
125

26
1 1d.
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contributions to federal candidates. 3 ' Federal law had long barred
corporations

from making contributions or expenditures

in

connection with federal election campaigns. In 1986, however, the
Court ruled that this ban could not be applied in all circumstances
to nonprofit, ideological corporations and that such organizations
have a First Amendment right to engage in independent, partisan
campaign expenditures advocating for or against particular federal
candidates.' 3 ' The issue in Beaumont was whether to extend that
right from making independent expenditures on behalf of specific
federal candidates to making direct campaign contributions to such
candidates.3 2

The lower court believed that such ideological

corporations posed none of the dangers associated with the
concerns over corporate wealth in elections.'33
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that those concerns
were applicable to nonprofit corporations as well.'34 The Court
observed that "some of the Nation's most politically powerful
organizations, including the AARP, the National Rifle Association,
and the Sierra Club" can raise large amounts of money and might
35
be used as "conduits for circumventing" contribution limits.

Accordingly, a prophylactic rule barring all corporate contributions

130 Id. at 2204-05.
1
'3'

133

See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
123 S. Ct. at 2205.
Id. at 2204-05.

134 Id. at 2208.
13

Id. at 2209-10.
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to candidates, regardless of what type of corporations were
36

involved, was appropriate. 1

Two dissenters, Justices Scalia and Thomas, rejected the
validity of a prophylactic rule as inconsistent with the kind of strict
scrutiny required for the kind of First Amendment deprivations
1 37
involved in this case.

The Beaumont case indeed tuined out to be a harbinger of
things to come. For at the end of 2003, the Court applied the same
deferential approach to uphold all of the major features of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,"

the so-called

McCain-Feingold law, which imposed broad restraints on the
ability of corporations, labor unions, wealthy individuals, and issue
advocacy cause organizations to become at all involved in federal
election campaigns or even election year issues.

39

In doing so, in

my opinion, the Court gave short shrift to the critical, core First
Amendment values at stake whenever government regulates
political speech, regulation which would seem an uncomfortable fit
with the textual fabric of the First Amendment.

CONCLUSION
This is the first Term in memory when not a single First
Amendment claim was valued or vindicated.

136

137
138

Id. at 2207.
123 S. Ct. at 2212 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

2 U.S.C. § 441 (2003).
139 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).

That result may
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simply be a function of the particular cases the Court reviewed and
the relatively small number of them.
On the other hand, if the recent campaign finance case is an
example, the majority of this Court is prepared to give a significant
degree of deference to the political branches where the First
Amendment is concerned. A generation ago, that would have been
an extraordinary observation.
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